SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF ULSTER

1. INTRODUCTION

      This is not a typical custody case.  It does not involve a child, and it does not involve an incompetent adult in need of a caretaker because she is unable to make important decisions about her health and safety.  But it does involve the custody of a living, feeling being with an undisputed physical and emotional life and consciousness, who is unable to make important decisions about her health and safety, and who is dependent on one or more adults as her caretaker.  Just as family law courts consider the interests of the wards before that bar, courts have been considering the interests of dependent animals in reaching decisions about their custody.  Here, this Court should consider Rafiki’s interests, not because of sentimental attachment but because prevailing legal authority mandates that treatment.  This brief sets out the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction over the issue at bar -- Rafiki’s placement and custody.

      The Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) submits this brief as amicus curiae, to assist the Court in its determination of this custody dispute involving a nonhuman; this is a situation which is occurring with increasing frequency across the country.  ALDF is a national, nonprofit organization of attorneys and supporting members that specializes in the analysis of legal issues affecting nonhuman animals and the advancement of a just treatment of animals within our legal system.  We urge this Court to include in its consideration of the instant action, the needs and interests of Rafiki, the [fill in description, e.g., two-year-old dog] whose placement the Court is being asked to determine.

2. ALDF’S QUALIFICATIONS AS AMICUS

      ALDF brings to this Court an unparalleled collective experience and education provided by more than twenty years of litigating and analyzing legal issues concerning the law as it pertains to animals.  ALDF has been involved in every aspect of the field of animal law, but most notably here has been involved in litigation and development of legal theory addressing the evaluation of nonhumans (both in pecuniary and nonpecuniary terms) by the courts.  ALDF and its member attorneys have been involved in many cases involving the exact issues faced by this Court.  They have analyzed these issues in a wide range of factual circumstances and under the laws of many states.

      Since the Court’s determination here requires appreciation of the exact legal areas in which ALDF has toiled for years, ALDF is in the best position to provide exceptional assistance to the Court in reaching its decision.

3. The unique nATURE OF Animals Requires Special Consideration Of Their Interests.

      While in the most hypertechnical sense Rafiki is legal “property”, that semantic status is not determinative of the Court’s decision.  The “property” label carries many different connotations in the courts.  This type of living, breathing, and feeling property has always been treated uniquely in the eyes of the law.  As set out in more detail below, the extensive protections afforded nonhumans under the law of every American jurisdiction mandate special consideration of issues concerning those beings under our care.  Thus such treatment be accorded to this Court’s determination -- which will affect Rafiki for the rest of her life.  Undisputed and consistent public policy and positive law mandate that Rafiki’s living conditions and caretakers can no more be decided by a reference to simple notions of property ownership than can that of a child for whom this Court might be asked to make a custody determination.

      As explained in the following sections, treatment as property neither denies nor impedes a fair judicial appraisal of the best placement for a dependent companion animal, with full evaluation of the needs of the animal and the best permanent home for her.

1. The “Property” Designation Is Simply Shorthand To Describe A Bundle Of Rights.

      Characterization as “property” does not depend on the inherent nature of the property described; instead, it simply describes the basic concept of the “bundle of rights” an owner maintains in property.¹  For example, the California Supreme Court has explained:

The term “property” is sufficiently comprehensive to include every species of estate, real and personal, and everything which one person can own and transfer to another. It extends to every species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money value.

Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 207 Cal. 521, 524 (1929) (citations omitted).  The “property” designation is simply a shorthand for the interest of the owner in the property.

      Further, neither value nor marketability determine the property designation.  Instead, as the Georgia Supreme Court recognized:   

Anything to which a person may hold a legal title is property, whether it has any market value or not.  It may have intrinsic value, but not exchangeable value.  It may serve a useful purpose and yet be unsalable and unexchangeable.  No one may want it, or have the use for it, except he who possesses it, and yet to him it may be a thing of value, that is, of intrinsic value, something that can be utilized in the accomplishment of his purpose or the attainment of his desire.  What do we mean when we say that a particular, visible, tangible thing is the property of the designated person?  Do we necessarily mean that it is something which he can sell in the market or exchange for something else?  We do not think so.  May not even an old letter, a faded photograph, or a lock of hair, treasured because of the associations and memories which the mere sight of it invokes, be the property of the person who possesses, treasures, and cherishes it, although no one else would care to possess it or give anything whatever in exchange for it?

Moody v. State, 56 S.E. 993, 994 (Ga. 1907).²

      Since “property” is just a bundle of rights, courts utilize the designation in a myriad of contexts, applying the term both to tangible and intangible interests.  See, e.g., Trademark Cases (United States v. Steffens), 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (trademark rights); Allied Investment Corp., 731 A.2d at 965 (stock certificates); In re Echo Enterprises, Inc., 324 S.E. 2d 312, 312 (S.C. 1984) (hunting and fishing rights); Golden v. State of Cal., 133 Cal. App. 3d 640, 645 (1955) (liquor license); Stallinger v. Goss, 193 P.2d 810 (Mont. 1948) (same); Deggender v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 83 P. 898 (Wash. 1906) (same); People v. Leyvas, 73 Cal. App. 2d 863, 866 (1946) (gas ration stamps); People v. Dunsworth, 56 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Ill. 1944) (same); Rest. 2d Judg. § 6, Comment 2 (chose in action).

      Courts apply the property designation to a variety of interests, and routinely recognize that different types of property have different types of interests.  Consequently, different claims and remedies are applicable, depending on the type of property in question.  For example, the United States Supreme Court has held the property interest in a trademark is “based upon the party’s right to be protected in the good will of a trade or business.”  Hanover Star Milling Co. v. D.D. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916), limited by statute as stated in Park ‘N Fly, Inc.  v. Dollar Park ‘N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985) 12. Distinguished by, Explained by: Levi Strauss & Co. v. GTFM, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 971, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5947, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1394 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  Because the exclusive right to a trademark is premised on the protection of a business’ good will, courts will protect the right to a trademark only in the “markets [to which] the use of a trademark has [been] extended.” Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 415-16 (imposing territorial limit on plaintiff’s use of trademark for flour); see also Application of Marriott Corp., 517 F.2d 1364 (Cust. & Pat. 1975) (registration may be territorially limited); Italian Swiss Colony v. Italian Vineyard Co., 158 Cal. 252, 257 (1910).

      Patents and copyrights, by contrast, are a different type of property which protect “the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.”  Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (original emphasis omitted).  Because the purpose of patents and copyrights is to protect “novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain,” the limitations on trademark rights do not apply.  Id.  Thus, unlike a trademark, patents and copyrights are valid throughout the United States, regardless of whether the holder does business in every state.

      Thus, even within the intellectual property arena, it is clear that the type of interest and type of property -- rather than the mere designation of something as property -- is determinative of the owner’s rights and remedies.  Put another way, the designation of something as “property” is meaningless without evaluation of the context within which the designation is used.  The property designation means only that the owner has a protectable interest.  It says nothing of the type of protection courts will afford to the owner, or the property itself, or what claims may be made and remedies had in disputes over the property.  Here, of course, the type of property at issue is not only living, breathing and feeling, it has enjoyed legislative and publicly-endorsed protections for centuries, as discussed below.  Logically, special considerations must be accorded to a dispute over the custody of this type of property.

2. Many Forms Of Property Have Protected Interests and Obligations.

      As discussed in the next section, nonhumans are protected by numerous state and federal laws.  Indeed, even inanimate objects and abstract concepts obtain significant legal protections.  Ships can be parties to lawsuits.  Corporations are considered separate legal entities – “persons” in the eyes of the law.  Erkenbrecher v. Grant, 187 Cal. 7, 9 (1921); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 14.³  Consequently, corporations are imbued with the following rights and obligations:

• Corporations have the capacity to sue in their own name.  Friendly Village Community Ass’n, Inc. No. IV v. Silva & Hill Construction Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 220, 224 (1973).
• Corporations have constitutional rights.  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777-80 (1978) (freedom of speech under the First Amendment and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment) Distinguished by, Cited in Dissenting Opinion at: McConnell v. FEC, 157 L. Ed. 2d 491, 124 S. Ct. 619, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 9195, 72 U.S.L.W. 4015, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 13, 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 10567 (U.S. 2003), Distinguished by: Courtroom TV Network LLC v. State, 1 Misc. 3d 328, 769 N.Y.S.2d 70, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 982 (2003);
• United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977) (Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532-33 (1970) (Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial).
• Corporations must pay taxes.  Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
• Corporations can donate money to charitable and political organizations.  Cal. Corp. Code § 207(e).
• Corporations can own property.  Cal. Corp. Code § 207(g).
• Corporations can enter into contracts.  Cal. Corp. Code § 207(g).

      Like corporations, trusts – whether testamentary or inter vivos – also are treated as separate legal entities and given special legal status and rights.  Trusts have the following privileges and obligations:⁴

• Trusts must pay taxes.  Cal. Probate Code § 16243, 21500 et seq.
• Trusts can own property in their own name.  Cal. Probate Code § 15202.
• Trusts can enter leases for real and personal property.  Cal. Probate Code §§ 16231-32.
• Trusts can hold shares in a corporation.  Cal. Probate Code § 16234.
• Trusts can maintain policies of insurance to protect the trust res.  Cal. Probate Code § 16240.
• Trusts can borrow money.  Cal. Probate Code § 16241.
• The trustee of a trust can maintain an action (and indeed has the duty to bring an action) to protect the trust res.  Triplett v. Williams, 269 Cal. App. 2d 135, 137 (1969).

3. Animals Have Always Been Considered A Sui Generis Type Of Property, Accorded A Myriad Of Protections.

      As the preceding sections illustrate, the property designation is just a semantic starting point, each type of property has its own set of factors which determine its treatment under the law.  Although property, the law has long recognized and codified that animals’ interests should be protected and considered.  The casebooks and statutory law are full of decisions and enactments directed at protecting the animals that live among us.  This body of law underscores the need for special treatment of animals in custody cases like that now before the Court.

1. Statutory Protection Of Animals

1. Animal Cruelty Statutes

      All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted animal cruelty laws, penalizing the mistreatment of animals.⁵  Twenty-five states treat some animal cruelty as a felony⁶; abandonment of an animal is a crime in eighteen.⁷ 

      The very issue at bar here -- custody of nonhumans -- has already been addressed by many states, and is an inherent component of the law of every state.  For example, in nine states, individuals convicted of animal cruelty must forfeit custody of their animals.⁸ A related consideration is added in the several states that have permissive or mandatory psychiatric treatment and/or evaluation of individuals convicted of cruelty to animals.⁹  Presumably the result of these evaluations is a dual determination of (1) the person’s fitness to own the animal and (2) the animal’s health and safety under the individual’s care.  Indeed, some states actually prohibit individuals convicted of animal cruelty from owning animals in the future.¹⁰  The policy behind these laws is clear -- animals must be protected and placed only in homes that will promote their continued health and well-being.

; West Valley City v. Streeter, 849 P.2d 613 (Utah App. 1993) (gamecocks used for fighting); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 629 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. 1993) (neglect of horses); Norton v. State, 820 S.W. 2d 272 (Ark. 1991) (failure to adequately care for goats and rabbits, causing them unnecessary discomfort); Tuck v. U.S., 467 A.2d 727 (D.C. App. 1983) (keeping puppies in unsanitary conditions in pet store); People v. Bunt, 462 N.Y.S. 2d 142 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1982) (beating dog with baseball bat); Wilkerson v. State, 401 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1981) (torturing raccoon). 

2. Federal Animal Protection Laws

      National public policy, embodied in federal law, reflects the same concern over treatment of animals.  As of 1995 there were more than sixty federal animal protection statutes.  See Henry Cohen, Federal Animal Protection Statutes, 1 Animal L. 143 (1995).  These statutes, like those of the states, reflect an appreciation of both the value of animals and the importance of proper placement for them.  See, e.g., the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 972 et seq.; the African Elephant Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4201 et seq.  The federal statutes protect everything from marine mammals, Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 et seq., to the bald eagle.  Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 et seq.  They protect animals at every stage, from birth, Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 41 et seq., to capture, the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, 16 U.S.C. § 971 et seq., and even through to the treatment and method in which they are slaughtered.  Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.  The message is clear -- federal law and policy are concerned with the treatment of animals.

National and Congressional recognition of the value of animal life is reflected in these statutes.  Custody was one of the main concerns behind the development of the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”).  In detailed language and authorized regulations, the AWA expressly defines the custody and care that must be provided to research animals in federally-funded facilities.  Indeed, the AWA was enacted to “insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibit purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment.”  7 U.S.C. § 2131(1).  Under the AWA the Secretary of Agriculture must “promulgate standards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors.”  7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1).  The Animal Welfare Act mandates that the standards include requirements “for animal care, treatment, and practices in experimental procedures to ensure that animal pain and distress are minimized.”  7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(A).  Congressional and agency views of “humane care and treatment” naturally stem from an assertion of jurisdiction over the custody and care of the subject animals.  Plainly, the health and safety of animals in custody is at the heart of the AWA.

      The Endangered Species Act is a further example of Congressional intent to oversee the protection of animals interests.  In that Act, Congress declared that “fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and to its people.”  16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).  For this reason, “the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the international community to conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction.”  16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4). 

      Similarly, in the Marine Mammal Protection Act, Congress declared:

marine mammals have proven themselves to be resources of great international significance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic, and it is the sense of the Congress that they should be protected and encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feasible commensurate with sound policies of resource management and that the primary objective of their management should be to maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosystem.

16 U.S.C. § 1361(6). 

2. Courts Routinely Acknowledge Animals Must Be Treated Differently Than Inanimate Forms of Property.

The preceding sections demonstrate not only a legislative and societal respect for the value of animal life, but also a recognition that animals have interests of their own that should be protected.  The courts are in agreement.  Indeed, several have held that companion animals possess unique traits that must be considered when evaluating damages for their injuries.  See, e.g., McDonald v. Ohio State University Veterinary Hospital, 644 N.E. 2d 750, 752 (Ct. Cl. Oh. 1994) (“unique” role dog played in plaintiff’s life included in damages calculation); Distinguished by: Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 151 Ohio App. 3d 741, 2003 Ohio 917, 785 N.E.2d 811, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 853 (Ohio Ct. App., Greene County 2003)

      Zager v. Dimilia, 524 N.Y.S. 2d 968, 970 (1988) (“the traditional restriction in personal property cases that the cost of repair should not exceed the market . . . value of the property should not be applied in a case where . . . a living creature is involved”); Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S. 2d [Page number is missing here, it should be 285] (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1980) (companionship and affection of companion animal provides should also be evaluated).

In Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hospital, Inc., 415 N.Y.S. 2d 182 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1979), Questioned by: Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 151 Ohio App. 3d 741, 2003 Ohio 917, 785 N.E.2d 811, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 853 (Ohio Ct. App., Greene County 2003)

      the court faced head-on the notion of animals as a sui generis form of property:

The court must first decide whether a pet such as a dog is only an item of personal property as prior cases have held. . .  [A] pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal property.. . .  A pet is not an inanimate thing that just receives affection, it also returns it.

********

This decision is not to be construed to include an award for the loss of a family heirloom which would also cause great mental anguish.  An heirloom while it might be the source of good feelings is merely an inanimate object and is not capable of returning love and affection.  It does not respond to human stimulation; it has no brain capable of displaying emotion which in turn causes a human response.  Losing the right to memorialize a pet rock, or a pet tree or losing a family picture album is not actionable.  But a dog is something else.  To say it is a piece of property and no more is a repudiation of our humanness.

Id.

      The specific issue in this case has already been decided in many other courts.  Courts deciding custody issues are increasingly finding the interests of animals must be considered in deciding cases like this one.  Courts in New York, Maryland, and Texas have ordered shared custody or visitation of animal companions, based solely or at least partly on the interests of the animals at issue.  Raymond v. Lachmann, 695 N.Y.S. 2d 308 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Assal v. Kidwell, Civil No. 164421 (Md. Cir. Ct., Montgomery Cty. Dec. 3, 1999) Could not Shepardize this cite;  it was not found on Lexis; Arrington v. Arrington, 613 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App. 1981). 

      In Raymond v. Lachman, plaintiff and defendant had been roommates and plaintiff’s cat had lived with them.  The two separated and defendant felt the cat belonged with him.  Plaintiff sought relief to obtain permanent custody of his “property”.  The trial court first recognized the interests of the cat as a sentient, companion animal by ordering the parties to “work out a visitation schedule” because “it does not appear to be within the best interest of the cat to shift custody back and forth.”  Id.  The court then reversed itself, however, and awarded the cat to plaintiff under a straight property analysis.  Id. (Jan. 8, 1998).  On appeal, that ruling was reversed.  The appellate court based its decision on (1) the interests of the cat as a feeling individual who had “lived, prospered, loved and been loved” in the residence now occupied by the defendant alone and (2) “the cherished status accorded to pets in our society.”  Raymond v. Lachmann, 695 N.Y.S. 2d 308, 309 (1999).

      In Zovko v. Gregory, No. CH 97-544 (Arlington County (Va.) Circuit Court, Oct. 17, 1997), Could not Shepardize this cite;  it was not found on Lexis, Grady, a cat originally belonging to defendant Gregory, was cared for by Zovko while the two men were roommates.  See Brooke A. Masters, In Courtroom Tug of War Over Custody, Roommate Wins the Kitty, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 13, 1997, at B1.  When the roommates separated and a custody dispute over Grady reached the courthouse, the court found “Grady’s happiness took priority. . . .  [Judge] Kendrick said he would decide ‘what is in the best interest of Grady . . .  From what I have seen, Grady would be better off with Mr. Zovko.’”  Id.

      The approach taken by the courts in Zovko and Raymond was not out of the ordinary, according to Gary Skoloff, Esq., author of New Jersey Family Law Practice, Editor-in-Chief of the Family Law Magazine of the American Bar Association and former chair of the ABA Family Law Section.  Mr. Skoloff is convinced that “ ‘judges consider pet custody a legitimate issue.  Many of the same arguments pertaining to child custody fit and no judge laughs at this.’”  Joan Lowell Smith, Pet Custody No Laughing Matter, N.J. STAR LEDGER, Mar. 9, 1997 (1997 WL 8052984). 

      Courts deciding cases involving animals other areas also have rejected a strict property analysis.  For example, the probate court of Chittenden County, Vermont set aside a provision in a will directing the executor to destroy any animals owned by the decedent at the time of his death.  Estate of Howard H. Brand, No. 28473 (Probate Ct., Chittenden County, Vt., Mar. 17, 1999) Could not Shepardize this cite;  it was not found on Lexis.  The court observed that other states repeatedly had found such a strict chattel treatment of decedents’ companion animals to violate public policy.¹¹  The court recognized the similar approaches taken in animal cases outside the realm of probate law and found that “[c]ourts in other jurisdictions have also recognized the distinction between companion animals and other forms of personal property in landlord tenant cases, tort actions, and even divorce decrees. . . .”  Id. at 4. 

      Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App. 1994) focused on the calculation of damages for the shooting of a cherished family dog.  In that evaluation, the emotive qualities of dogs was addressed.  “Scientific research has provided a wealth of understanding to us that we cannot rightly ignore.  We now know that mammals share with us a great many emotive and cognitive characteristics” -- characteristics which necessarily distinguish companion animals from chattels having no discernible interest of their own.  Id. at 378 (Andell, J., concurring).  Judge Andell continued:

The law must be informed by evolving knowledge and attitudes.  Otherwise, it risks becoming irrelevant as a means of resolving conflicts.  Society has long since moved beyond the untenable Cartesian view that animals are unfeeling automatons and, hence, mere property.  The law should reflect society’s recognition that animals are sentient and emotive beings that are capable of providing companionship to the humans with whom they live.

Id.¹²

4. Scientific Research Establishes The Cognitive And Psychological Reality Of Animals’ Lives.

      Judge Andell’s opinion is thoroughly supported by both society’s vast experience, and our considerable scientific knowledge, of the interests of these individuals who -- though perhaps not possessed of minds equivalent to those of competent adult humans -- certainly possess a similar nervous system, experience physical sensations such as hunger and pain similarly, and have mental and emotional lives.  According to David O. Wiebers, M.D., professor and chair of the Division of Cerebrovascular Diseases and consultant in neurology and clinical epidemiology at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota:

The EEGs of animals are analogous to those of humans . . . This is not surprising given that the brain structure and other central and peripheral nervous system structures and circuitry, down to the cellular level, are analogous in humans and other animals . . . .  These structures include . . . sensory systems for pain and touch perception, vision, hearing, taste, and smell; and, in many cases, centers which mediate mood and personality. . . .

Other physicians and scientists have made similar observations about the minds of humans and other animals.  The eminent British neurologist Lord Walter Russell Brain (1895-1966) observed, . . . “I at least cannot doubt that the interests and activities of animals are correlated with awareness and feeling in the same way as my own.” 

David O. Wiebers, Healing Society’s Relationship with Animals, SUNRISE, June/July 1995, at 164, 165, 167.  Biologists and ethologists (i.e., experts in the study of animal behavior) likewise have established that mammals have their own needs and desires, including those of a social/psychological nature as well as the physical.  See, e.g., M. Bekoff and D. Jamieson, Reflective Ethology, Applied Philosophy, and the Moral Status of Animals, in 9 PERSPECTIVES IN ETHOLOGY 1-47 (1991); D. R. Griffin, ANIMAL THINKING (1984); C.A. Ristau ed., COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY: THE MINDS OF OTHER ANIMALS.  For this reason, an increasing chorus of scholars are urging the courts to give sentient beings like Rafiki the human and humane consideration they scientifically and physiologically deserve, in cases just like this one.¹³

      Custody decisions involving minors and incompetent humans are made on behalf of individuals who need care based on the courts’ determinations of what placement will best serve those individuals.  The determination is made by courts weighing pertinent factors, in an effort to promote physical and emotional well-being to the greatest extent possible.  As demonstrated here, those same concerns and principles are before the bar in custody cases involving companion animals.

      It is well-established that animals suffer emotional traumas (such as those from a bad home environment) in much the same way we do -- that is, that they exhibit a range of behaviors which reflect their personalized feelings.